WHERE TO START
As an improvement expert, I am sometimes asked, “How do you know
where to start? How do you zero in on a problem area with a high
likelihood that sustainable improvements can be made?”
The answer is two parts consisting of: 1) the obvious and
familiar starting strategy of ‘follow the money’; and 2) the
“trade secret” of improvement.
"Following the money" simply means auditing the ‘critical path’
– a sequence of tasks that must be executed in order for the
business to get paid. This path begins with the sale and ends
when good product and a correct invoice is delivered to a
satisfied customer. I look for the things you might expect along
this path, capacities & bottlenecks, first pass yields, proper
tools for the job, and so on.
The “trade secret” of successful improvement is this:
Look for indecision, uncertainty, and trial & error
behavior. Now, let me stress that this is not
the problem. It’s a symptom or warning flag, an “X” that
marks exactly the spot on the business ‘critical path” where one
should “dig for treasure”. Improvement is not simply achieved by
squashing disagreement and reckless boldness.
I have tracked these clues through all kinds of processes: call
centers, accounting operations, technology infrastructure and
manufacturing. One of the clearest illustrations
that 'trial and error behavior' marks a serious process problem
is the story of one client’s metal machining
operation.
THE STORY OF THE “EIGHT” STATION
The plant had everything from low end computer controlled
cutting equipment (“CNC” machines) to high end finishing
equipment designed for better than 100 millionths of an inch
tolerances.
The natural attractions to the engineers are all of the complex
CNC devices, and the high precision finishing tools, but in this
facility there was a “big payoff” opportunity that
had not been discovered.
An inexpensive series of “low tech” workstations prepared every
single metal casting before they went into the CNC or
finish-work processes. The centerpiece of this line was called,
the “eight” station. Designed for low cost and maximum
throughput, the heart of this workstation was a turntable on
which eight un-worked metal castings were placed at forty-five
degree intervals.
The table would make a 1/8th turn, and each of seven machining
stations would make their specific cut. Station #8 was for the
operator who loaded and unloaded parts. It seemed to be a
bottleneck, but was there room for improvement?
It was soon obvious to me that this particular operation was a
den of confusion. The operators called it, “the
machine from hell”. “Only Johnny can set it up,
and it takes hours.”, they said.
As I watched, I quickly saw why the machine was so difficult to
set up. Eight fixtures for holding parts must be bolted onto the
turntable. They could be placed too close or too far from the
center of the table. They could be placed too far to the left or
to the right. Two “degrees of freedom” times eight fixtures
equals sixteen different adjustments that must be exactly right.
There was more. The operators had to unbolt and lever the
machining stations into position.
Seven moveable machining stations meant fourteen more dimensions
to the problem. There were a grand total of 30 independent but
interrelated dimensional adjustments that had to be brought into
“harmony” before the machine was set correctly.
I watched as “Johnny”, the best operator in the house, struggled
for hours to get all the pieces of this machine into position.
Tweaking the setup by trial and error, one adjustment always led
to a dozen re-adjustments. A “trial run” meant wasting raw
material by making sample cuts that were sent to the measurement
lab for evaluation. It was usually fatigue and an urgent demand
for production that caused him to surrender the cause, and
actually attempt to produce a product.
THE SOLUTION
I took a little time to think about the problem. How should
the setup of this machine be handled? When I thought I had
the answer, I went back to Johnny. “Tell me”, I asked, “Is there
anything on this machine you won’t move to make a
correct setup?”
Johnny answered, “Well, the engineers told me that I should try
not to move the stations on the left and right of the operator
position. They didn’t know why. I tried the leave them alone,
but I’ve had to move them anyhow.”
His answer confirmed my suspicions. The designer had intended
that two of the workstations together with the exact center of
the turntable form a perfect ninety-degree angle.
Those three points would establish the absolute
reference frame from which every component could easily and
systematically be placed in its one and only one correct
position.
Once this “carpenter’s square” had been broken, the machine
could no longer be set up with certainty. There was no longer
“one and only one place” to position any component. The solution
was: 1) to reestablish the permanent location of the two
operator-adjacent stations by precision measurement, and 2) to
teach the operators that the setup process must be remembered
as:
A) The built-in 90-degree reference angle shows where to exactly
place
B) Fixtures, which show you the “one and only one” place for the
C) Remaining five stations.
There were some optional elements to this improved setup, but it
was no longer trial and error. Instead, it was now a
consistent process with a predictable duration and a certain
outcome.
THE REST OF THE STORY
The rest of the story has to answer one big question.
What drove the operators to break the
rule, and move the two forbidden machine stations?
Of course, the obvious point is that no one in the plant truly
understood the significance of those two stations on either side
of the operator. An implicit right angle is a way to establish a
repeatable frame of reference for measurement.
The not as obvious, but most fundamental flaw
was in the management’s decision rules established for:
“How do you know when a setup is correct?” The proper answer is,
“When you are certain that you have adhered to a correct setup
process.” It is engineering’s responsibility to see
that a correct process will produce a correct product.
In this plant, a flawed decision rule had been substituted.
Setup was deemed to be “wrong” if a sample part failed a QC
measurement check. This policy is flawed from the start because
of the assumption that a single selected sample will always be
‘average’. Questionable measurement precision in this plant
compounded the problem, and drove operators relentlessly to a
point where they felt they had not alternative but to “break”
the machine to gain setup approval.
FOOTNOTE for the
Mechanical Engineer:
“Pinning” this machine was not the solution, and only add
constraints that make it impossible to correct the problem.
After the reference angle was broken, engineering had tried
to sort out the mess by pinning some of the fixtures,
making matters worse.

