Operation Improvement Inc.

Dilbert and His Boss

There are two sides to an old argument, and I have heard both many times and in many circumstances.

The debate usually begins like this: Dilbert, who is a salesman, agent, operator, mechanic, accountant, engineer, programmer, or some other front-line soldier of business, puts the discussion in play.

“What a disaster in the making! Our new boss has no clue about the details of this business. No doubt they teach them in school that managers need not know the business to run it. This happened at the last place I worked, and they closed in less than a year. Better get your resumes ready!”

The other side of the coin is usually argued by a generalist manager who, by their protests, identifies themself as the boss that Dilbert is talking about. They want to defend their contribution to a company’s success.

“Well, I was hired to turn around XYZ, Inc., and I did it in less than a year! I reorganized (or reprioritized, rescheduled, relocated, re-incentivized) the organization with retreats, goals, Monday staff meetings, MBO, metrics. I don’t have to know what I am measuring to interpret the data. There is a place for the professional manager. Why, just look what happens to a company when they put an accountant, engineer, or a salesman in charge!”

We have all seen situations or heard stories that would seem to support both positions. This leads us to think that there might be an underlying condition, a hidden “if” that tilts a case study to one position or the other.

What Is It About the Organization That Needs Fixing?

In some businesses, operational flaws are minor, and the organization needs a cohesive vision and strategy. Such a business has well-designed processes and a tactical workforce that understands the business product.

Without direction, the best tactical teams often lack focus. A new manager may remedy this problem without spending a lot of time deep in the nuts and bolts of operations. The perfect analogy is a parked car with no place to go, its finely tuned engine running, waiting for a driver and destination.

Competent tacticians who are quite comfortable with tactical decisions are often paralyzed by strategic choices. When an issue is purely tactical, a T ledger can be made of pros and cons, or a clever programmer can code a decision tree. Even if some of the inputs are probabilistic (e.g., 40% chance of project delay due to weather), it is still possible to reduce the issue to a data-driven solution.

When tacticians are confronted with choices that require weighing values and qualitative risks or picking one of three alternatives, many tacticians find themselves in a Hamlet loop. They will debate the “To be or not to be” of the issue endlessly and without resolution. After exhausting everyone with all of their reasons for an initiative, they can return from a break with a hundred and one reasons against, suddenly opposing the position they just held before lunch.

One successful turnaround manager said, “My new staff had fourteen different visions of the company mission.” His success depended on getting the organization to focus on one vision, and not upon learning the details of each technician’s job.

But what if the organization is not a finely maintained and tuned race car looking for a driver? To continue the analogy, what if the car has not been maintained? What if parts have been removed and not replaced because they were too much trouble? How do you make an operation right, and then make it better?

Eventually, Management Needs to Get into the Details

I’m wary of the turnaround experts who brag that they can always “move the numbers” without knowing the operation. Many organizations in trouble have problems that go deeper than motivation, vision, and focus.

Sometimes managers fool themselves. They think improvements have been made, and they haven’t. A problem seems to disappear only to pop up somewhere else.

I know (and can uncover) most of the tricks to transfer costs from the business to the customer or to the employee, from the P&L to the balance sheet, from one department or plant to another, and from the short term to the long term. Such zero-sum changes to a business do not improve the operation and usually cause harm.

A further complication is that many traditional performance metrics are lagging indicators and can temporarily move in the wrong direction during periods of transition. I have two real-life cases that I have used in training classes where operations service level statistics temporarily became better as customer service got worse.

Managers who do not understand their business processes are terrified of a transition when the metrics are providing misleading feedback, and they often say, “I’m scared to run the business right!”

Eventually, all managers must develop an understanding of the details of their business operation. Those managers fortunate enough to inherit a capable tactical organization will eventually need to turn their attention to sustainment. Those who inherit an operation with incapable processes need details as a prerequisite to focus and vision.

As I have said in our Management Philosophy, “You need not be a surgeon to discuss brain surgery, but you should at least be able to define brain and surgery. If it is true that you can’t effectively manage without measuring, you surely can’t manage what you cannot define.”

© Operation Improvement Inc 2025. All rights reserved.

WHERE TO START

As an improvement consultant, I am asked, “How do you know where to start? How do you zero in on a problem area with a high likelihood that sustainable improvements can be made?”

The answer is in two parts. There is the obvious and familiar starting strategy—follow the money—and then there is a trade secret of rapid improvement.

Following the money simply means auditing the critical path—the sequence of tasks that must be executed in order for the business to get paid. I look for the things you might expect along this path: capacities and bottlenecks, first-pass yields, proper tools for the job, and so on.

But the trade secret of rapid improvement is this:

Look for indecision, uncertainty, and trial-and-error behavior.

Now, let me stress that this is not the problem. It is a symptom or warning flag, an X that marks exactly the spot on the business-critical path where one should dig for treasure. Improvement is not simply achieved by squashing disagreement and reckless boldness that pretends to be certainty.

I have tracked these revealing clues through all kinds of processes: call centers, accounting operations, technology infrastructure, and manufacturing. One of the clearest illustrations that trial-and-error behavior denotes a serious process problem is the story of one client’s metal machining operation.

THE STORY OF THE EIGHT STATION

This manufacturing plant had everything, from computer-controlled cutting equipment (CNC machines) to high-end finishing equipment designed for tolerances better than 100 millionths of an inch.

The natural interest of the engineers was the complex CNC devices and the high-precision finishing tools, but in this facility there was a big payoff opportunity that had not been discovered.

An inexpensive series of low-tech workstations prepared every single metal casting before it went into the CNC or finish-work processes. The centerpiece of this line was called the eight-station. Designed for low cost and maximum throughput, the heart of this workstation was a turntable on which eight unworked metal castings were placed at forty-five-degree intervals.

The table would make a one-eighth turn, and each of seven machining stations would simultaneously make their specific cuts. Station #8 was for the operator who loaded and unloaded parts.

It was soon obvious to me that this particular operation was a den of confusion. The operators called it the machine from hell. “Only Johnny can set it up, and it takes hours,” they said.

As I watched, I quickly saw why the machine was so difficult to set up.

• Eight fixtures for holding parts must be bolted onto the turntable.
• They could be placed too close or too far from the center of the table.
• They could be placed too far to the left or to the right.
• Two degrees of freedom times eight fixtures equals sixteen different adjustments that must be exactly right.

There was more.

• The operators had to unbolt and lever the machining stations into position.
• Seven movable machining stations meant fourteen more dimensions to the problem.
• There was a grand total of 30 independent but interrelated dimensional adjustments that had to be brought into harmony before the machine was set correctly.

I watched as Johnny, the best operator in the house, struggled for hours to get all the pieces of this machine into position. Tweaking the setup by trial and error, one adjustment always led to a dozen readjustments.

A trial run meant wasting raw material by making sample cuts that were sent to the measurement lab for evaluation. It was usually fatigue and an urgent demand for production that forced him to surrender the effort and attempt to produce a product.

THE SOLUTION

I took a little time to think about the problem. How should the setup of this machine be handled? When I thought I had the answer, I went back to Johnny.

“Tell me,” I asked, “is there anything on this machine you won’t move to make a correct setup?”

Johnny answered, “Well, the engineers told me that I should try not to move the stations on the left and right of the operator position. They didn’t know why. I tried to leave them alone but I’ve had to move them anyhow.”

His answer confirmed my suspicions. The machine’s designer had intended that two of the workstations, together with the center of the turntable, form a perfect ninety-degree angle.

Those three points would establish the absolute reference frame from which every component could easily and systematically be placed in its one and only correct position.

Once this carpenter’s square had been broken, the machine could no longer be set up with certainty. There was no longer one and only one place to position any component.

The solution was:

1. Re-establish the permanent location of the two machining stations on either side of the operator by precision measurement.
2. Teach the operators that the setup process must be remembered as an ABC sequence that must be followed carefully and in order.

a) The built-in 90-degree reference angle must never be altered. It shows where to exactly place fixtures.

b) All fixtures are systematically placed on the turntable underneath the two permanently positioned machining workstations on either side of the operator. The table is turned, and then all placed fixtures then determine the one and only place for the remaining five movable machining workstations.

c) The remaining five workstations are positioned last, after every fixture has been placed on the table and carefully aligned with the immovable workstations on either side of the operator.

There were some optional elements to this improved setup, but it was no longer trial and error. Instead, it was now a consistent process with a predictable duration and a certain outcome.

THE REST OF THE STORY

The rest of the story has to answer one big question.

What drove the operators to break the rule and move the two forbidden machine stations?

First of all, no one in the plant truly understood the significance of those two stations on either side of the operator.

A perfect 90-degree angle establishes a repeatable frame of reference for measurement.

Although operators were directed to never move two of the machining workstations, they later received directions that created a conflict.

A reliance on obedience to procedure combined with an absence of process knowledge is a risky thing. If there are two orders to obey, and the orders appear to conflict, then what will happen?

Without process knowledge, the outcome is left to chance.

Secondly, the conflict was created by a fundamental flaw in management’s setup decision rules.

How do you know when a setup is correct? The flawed decision rule said, “A sample cut must be made and compared to specifications.”

The proper decision rule for “correct” is, “When you have audited and are certain that you have adhered to every aspect of a correct setup process.” It is engineering’s responsibility to see that a correct process will produce the intended product.

In this plant, setup was deemed to be wrong if a sample part failed a QC measurement check. (Imagine a math teacher who only checks answers and not how the answer was computed!)

This plant’s setup policy was additionally flawed because of the assumption that a single selected sample will always be average.

Questionable measurement precision of sample product in this plant compounded the problem and drove operators to a point where they felt they had no alternative but to break the machine to gain setup approval.

FOOTNOTE FOR THE MECHANICAL ENGINEER:

Pinning this machine was not the solution and only added constraints that made it impossible to correct the problem.

After the reference angle was broken, the engineering department had tried to sort out the mess by welding positioning pins to the turntable. They deprived the setup operator of the ability to make necessary adjustments and therefore made matters worse.

Copyright © 2025 Operation Improvement Inc. All rights reserved.

What are the similarities and differences between managing a few or many? What advice would you give to the newly promoted? What will be similar? What is going to change?

The Similarities

Managers always work with and through the cooperation of others. Management at any level relies on a proper organization of work and on the competencies of others to be successful. Management of many simply exaggerates this fact and makes it more obvious.

Technology may enhance our power to speak, and we have the means to issue directives to a billion people, but technology cannot make it possible to listen to a billion individuals. We will never listen to, read an email from, or read a book by most of the people alive on the planet today, nor will we see news stories or movies featuring them.

Do the math! Fifteen minutes listening only once to a person multiplied by 100,000 people takes 12 years at a dedicated 40 hours per week!

It is a proper organizational structure and division of labor that makes it possible for leaders of few or many to listen to the right things at the right time.

If the organizational structure is sound, all managers deal with approximately the same number of direct reports and peers. I discussed this with a Parris Island Marine colonel who put it this way:

“The Corps develops leadership throughout the organization, training individuals to step forward into the next tier of responsibility. Although I am responsible for more than a thousand Marines, I spend most of my time working closely with about a dozen other people, and so does a squad leader.”

The Differences

As managers are promoted to higher and higher levels of responsibility, there will be two key differences:

1. What is directly perceivable or self-evident to the junior manager becomes increasingly abstract at higher levels. The reverse is also true! Each must think about what the other simply sees.

The view from thirty thousand feet is a metaphor often used to dismiss the CEO’s perspective for being blind to the so-called facts on the ground, but the view from four feet has weaknesses as well. The fact is, from the two perspectives, each observer sees what the other must understand abstractly.

2. With each promotion, a manager’s role in an organization involves more strategic decisions and fewer tactical decisions.

Risk Becomes Real to the Manager of Many

It is difficult for many entry-level managers to incorporate risk analysis in their decision-making. Risk is so abstract that it doesn’t seem to possess the power of reality.

Suppose spare tires were options when you purchased your first car. “Take it,” the dealer would advise. “You’ll need it if you have a flat!” Suppose you don’t buy the spare, and in ten years of driving you never had the predicted flat tire. What conclusions would you draw?

Good management practices in small organizations often target the management and reduction of risk. If risks are small, good habits often go unrewarded and bad habits often go unpunished.

For example, a capability study may calculate an increased risk of scrap if a process is operated while SPC analysis shows the process is out of control. Some managers choose to flout the statistical warnings and press on, avoiding scrap on their watch by luck of the draw.

The manager of many is subject to the discipline of large numbers. The abstract risk in small numbers approaches a tangible certainty as the numbers increase. The principles underlying actions will have many more opportunities to manifest their consequences.

This calls for a small revision of an old warning: “Be careful what you ask for: in small numbers you risk getting it; in large numbers you will!”

This large-number effect applies to the many unlikely but possible adversities and tragedies of life and work. For example, the manager of many will more likely encounter difficult employee issues. Many managers of ten may, with luck, avoid a problem employee decision for a year or even five. The biggest risk for the newly promoted is the failure to deal directly, rationally, and decisively with the unpleasant when it inevitably arises.

Everyday Work Is Abstract to the Manager of Many

It becomes impossible to understand a very large business by just looking. The work must be conceptualized.

Properly done, process dependencies and management metrics tell the manager of ten what they are seeing with their own eyes. For the manager of many, conceptual tools are the only way to grasp the current state of the business.

The newly promoted manager must strive to master the appropriate tools of their position and not simply imitate the motions of their predecessor. They also need to learn to detect flawed legacy reports that are actually floating abstractions,  conceptual fantasies that claim to describe the current state of the business but actually have no connection to reality.

Higher Management Decisions Are Increasingly Strategic

With each promotion, a manager’s role in an organization involves more strategic decisions and fewer tactical decisions. Some reflection on the division of labor in decision-making is in order. Are you ultimately responsible for the commercial success of a product or product family? Do you manage the supporting engineering and project departments necessary to build and modify the processes of your business? Or are you expected to run the existing processes as correctly and consistently as possible?

The top leadership of an organization is responsible for its policy—the integrating idea of what the company will be and what it will do. Strategic decision-makers are responsible for goals, the evaluation of risk, and the identification and operational funding of necessary project objectives and process capabilities.

Within the constraints of operational funding, tactical decision-makers are responsible for (a) the correct and consistent execution of projects and (b) the correct and consistent operations of business processes.

A Final Piece of Advice to the Newly Promoted Manager

It is a mistake to think that your last job has prepared you for your new job. The competencies you have perfected in your last job are perfect for just that—your last job. The policy of learning something new every day is increasingly important with each promotion. It can help you beat the Peter Principle, the pattern of promotion beyond productiveness.

© Operation Improvement Inc 2025. All rights reserved.

From Grok.com:

“Before Six Sigma, Lean, and the Black Belt concept emerged in the 1980s, several foundational quality management and process improvement methodologies shaped the landscape. These precursors influenced the development of modern quality systems, focusing on defect reduction, efficiency, and statistical control. Here’s a concise overview of what came before, in rough chronological order:

1. Statistical Quality Control (SQC) – 1920s–1940s

• Key Figure: Walter A. Shewhart at Bell Laboratories developed SQC in the 1920s, introducing control charts to monitor process variability and distinguish between common and special causes of defects.
• Impact: Shewhart’s work laid the statistical foundation for quality control, emphasizing data-driven decision-making. His Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle, later refined by W. Edwards Deming, became a cornerstone of continuous improvement.
• Context: Used in manufacturing, particularly during World War II, to ensure consistent production quality.

1. Total Quality Control (TQC) – 1950s

• Key Figure: Armand V. Feigenbaum introduced TQC in the 1950s, emphasizing quality as a company-wide responsibility, not just a manufacturing function.
• Impact: TQC integrated quality into design, production, and customer service, influencing Japanese industries post-WWII. It introduced the idea that quality impacts costs and customer satisfaction, a precursor to Six Sigma’s customer-focused metrics.
• Context: Adopted widely in Japan, where it evolved into broader quality management practices.

1. Japanese Quality Movement (Post-WWII, 1940s–1960s)

• Key Figures: W. Edwards Deming and Joseph M. Juran worked with Japanese companies like Toyota and Sony, introducing statistical methods and quality philosophies. Deming emphasized PDCA and system-wide improvements, while Juran focused on the “quality trilogy” (planning, control, improvement).
• Impact: Japan’s focus on quality circles—small employee groups solving quality issues—improved processes and reduced waste, directly influencing Lean’s emphasis on teamwork and efficiency. The Japanese approach prioritized continuous improvement (Kaizen), a key Lean principle.
• Context: This movement transformed Japan into a global leader in quality, inspiring Western companies to adopt similar practices.

1. Toyota Production System (TPS) – 1940s–1970s

• Key Figures: Taiichi Ohno and Eiji Toyoda developed TPS, which became the foundation of Lean manufacturing.
• Impact: TPS focused on eliminating waste (muda), improving flow, and optimizing production through techniques like Just-In-Time (JIT) and Jidoka (automation with human intelligence). It emphasized respect for people and continuous improvement, directly shaping Lean’s core principles.
• Context: TPS made Toyota a benchmark for efficiency, influencing Lean’s spread to the U.S. in the 1980s.

1. Quality Circles – 1960s–1970s

• Origin: Popularized in Japan by Kaoru Ishikawa, quality circles involved workers collaborating to identify and solve quality issues.
• Impact: These groups fostered employee involvement and problem-solving, a precursor to the team-based project work in Six Sigma (e.g., Black Belt-led teams). Ishikawa’s cause-and-effect diagrams (fishbone diagrams) are still used in Six Sigma.
• Context: Widely adopted in Japanese industries, later influencing Western quality programs.

1. Total Quality Management (TQM) – 1970s–1980s

• Key Figures: Building on TQC, Deming, Juran, and Philip B. Crosby popularized TQM in the U.S. and globally. Crosby’s “zero defects” concept emphasized prevention over inspection.
• Impact: TQM integrated quality into all organizational processes, focusing on customer satisfaction, employee involvement, and continuous improvement. It lacked Six Sigma’s rigorous statistical focus but shared its goal of defect reduction and process optimization.
• Context: TQM was widely adopted by Western companies in the 1980s, including Motorola, which later developed Six Sigma.

How These Led to Six Sigma, Lean, and Black Belts

• Six Sigma (1986): Motorola’s Bill Smith and Mikel Harry built on SQC and TQM, adding rigorous statistical tools (e.g., aiming for 3.4 defects per million opportunities) and a structured methodology (DMAIC). The Black Belt concept, inspired by martial arts, formalized roles for trained experts, drawing from TQM’s focus on leadership and training.
• Lean (1980s–1990s): Lean evolved directly from TPS, popularized in the U.S. by James Womack and Daniel Jones in their book The Machine That Changed the World (1990). It focused on waste elimination and flow, complementing Six Sigma’s defect focus.
• Black Belts: The Black Belt role, introduced by Motorola, was a novel way to professionalize quality roles, inspired by martial arts hierarchies (developed by Jigoro Kano in the 1880s for judo) and built on TQM’s emphasis on trained quality leaders.

These earlier methodologies provided the statistical, cultural, and operational foundations for Six Sigma and Lean, with Black Belts emerging as a structured way to implement these principles. “