Archive
Managing 10 or 1000
What are the similarities and differences between managing a few or many? What advice would you give to the newly promoted? What will be similar? What is going to change?
The Similarities
Managers always work with and through the cooperation of others. Management at any level relies on a proper organization of work and on the competencies of others to be successful. Management of many simply exaggerates this fact and makes it more obvious.
Technology may enhance our power to speak, and we have the means to issue directives to a billion people, but technology cannot make it possible to listen to a billion individuals. We will never listen to, read an email from, or read a book by most of the people alive on the planet today, nor will we see news stories or movies featuring them.
Do the math! Fifteen minutes listening only once to a person multiplied by 100,000 people takes 12 years at a dedicated 40 hours per week!
It is a proper organizational structure and division of labor that makes it possible for leaders of few or many to listen to the right things at the right time.
If the organizational structure is sound, all managers deal with approximately the same number of direct reports and peers. I discussed this with a Parris Island Marine colonel who put it this way:
“The Corps develops leadership throughout the organization, training individuals to step forward into the next tier of responsibility. Although I am responsible for more than a thousand Marines, I spend most of my time working closely with about a dozen other people, and so does a squad leader.”
The Differences
As managers are promoted to higher and higher levels of responsibility, there will be two key differences:
1. What is directly perceivable or self-evident to the junior manager becomes increasingly abstract at higher levels. The reverse is also true! Each must think about what the other simply sees.
The view from thirty thousand feet is a metaphor often used to dismiss the CEO’s perspective for being blind to the so-called facts on the ground, but the view from four feet has weaknesses as well. The fact is, from the two perspectives, each observer sees what the other must understand abstractly.
2. With each promotion, a manager’s role in an organization involves more strategic decisions and fewer tactical decisions.
Risk Becomes Real to the Manager of Many
It is difficult for many entry-level managers to incorporate risk analysis in their decision-making. Risk is so abstract that it doesn’t seem to possess the power of reality.
Suppose spare tires were options when you purchased your first car. “Take it,” the dealer would advise. “You’ll need it if you have a flat!” Suppose you don’t buy the spare, and in ten years of driving you never had the predicted flat tire. What conclusions would you draw?
Good management practices in small organizations often target the management and reduction of risk. If risks are small, good habits often go unrewarded and bad habits often go unpunished.
For example, a capability study may calculate an increased risk of scrap if a process is operated while SPC analysis shows the process is out of control. Some managers choose to flout the statistical warnings and press on, avoiding scrap on their watch by luck of the draw.
The manager of many is subject to the discipline of large numbers. The abstract risk in small numbers approaches a tangible certainty as the numbers increase. The principles underlying actions will have many more opportunities to manifest their consequences.
This calls for a small revision of an old warning: “Be careful what you ask for: in small numbers you risk getting it; in large numbers you will!”
This large-number effect applies to the many unlikely but possible adversities and tragedies of life and work. For example, the manager of many will more likely encounter difficult employee issues. Many managers of ten may, with luck, avoid a problem employee decision for a year or even five. The biggest risk for the newly promoted is the failure to deal directly, rationally, and decisively with the unpleasant when it inevitably arises.
Everyday Work Is Abstract to the Manager of Many
It becomes impossible to understand a very large business by just looking. The work must be conceptualized.
Properly done, process dependencies and management metrics tell the manager of ten what they are seeing with their own eyes. For the manager of many, conceptual tools are the only way to grasp the current state of the business.
The newly promoted manager must strive to master the appropriate tools of their position and not simply imitate the motions of their predecessor. They also need to learn to detect flawed legacy reports that are actually floating abstractions, conceptual fantasies that claim to describe the current state of the business but actually have no connection to reality.
Higher Management Decisions Are Increasingly Strategic
With each promotion, a manager’s role in an organization involves more strategic decisions and fewer tactical decisions. Some reflection on the division of labor in decision-making is in order. Are you ultimately responsible for the commercial success of a product or product family? Do you manage the supporting engineering and project departments necessary to build and modify the processes of your business? Or are you expected to run the existing processes as correctly and consistently as possible?
The top leadership of an organization is responsible for its policy—the integrating idea of what the company will be and what it will do. Strategic decision-makers are responsible for goals, the evaluation of risk, and the identification and operational funding of necessary project objectives and process capabilities.
Within the constraints of operational funding, tactical decision-makers are responsible for (a) the correct and consistent execution of projects and (b) the correct and consistent operations of business processes.
A Final Piece of Advice to the Newly Promoted Manager
It is a mistake to think that your last job has prepared you for your new job. The competencies you have perfected in your last job are perfect for just that—your last job. The policy of learning something new every day is increasingly important with each promotion. It can help you beat the Peter Principle, the pattern of promotion beyond productiveness.
© Operation Improvement Inc 2025. All rights reserved.
Grok Says: The History of Quality Science
From Grok.com:
“Before Six Sigma, Lean, and the Black Belt concept emerged in the 1980s, several foundational quality management and process improvement methodologies shaped the landscape. These precursors influenced the development of modern quality systems, focusing on defect reduction, efficiency, and statistical control. Here’s a concise overview of what came before, in rough chronological order:
- Statistical Quality Control (SQC) – 1920s–1940s
- Key Figure: Walter A. Shewhart at Bell Laboratories developed SQC in the 1920s, introducing control charts to monitor process variability and distinguish between common and special causes of defects.
- Impact: Shewhart’s work laid the statistical foundation for quality control, emphasizing data-driven decision-making. His Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle, later refined by W. Edwards Deming, became a cornerstone of continuous improvement.
- Context: Used in manufacturing, particularly during World War II, to ensure consistent production quality.
- Total Quality Control (TQC) – 1950s
- Key Figure: Armand V. Feigenbaum introduced TQC in the 1950s, emphasizing quality as a company-wide responsibility, not just a manufacturing function.
- Impact: TQC integrated quality into design, production, and customer service, influencing Japanese industries post-WWII. It introduced the idea that quality impacts costs and customer satisfaction, a precursor to Six Sigma’s customer-focused metrics.
- Context: Adopted widely in Japan, where it evolved into broader quality management practices.
- Japanese Quality Movement (Post-WWII, 1940s–1960s)
- Key Figures: W. Edwards Deming and Joseph M. Juran worked with Japanese companies like Toyota and Sony, introducing statistical methods and quality philosophies. Deming emphasized PDCA and system-wide improvements, while Juran focused on the “quality trilogy” (planning, control, improvement).
- Impact: Japan’s focus on quality circles—small employee groups solving quality issues—improved processes and reduced waste, directly influencing Lean’s emphasis on teamwork and efficiency. The Japanese approach prioritized continuous improvement (Kaizen), a key Lean principle.
- Context: This movement transformed Japan into a global leader in quality, inspiring Western companies to adopt similar practices.
- Toyota Production System (TPS) – 1940s–1970s
- Key Figures: Taiichi Ohno and Eiji Toyoda developed TPS, which became the foundation of Lean manufacturing.
- Impact: TPS focused on eliminating waste (muda), improving flow, and optimizing production through techniques like Just-In-Time (JIT) and Jidoka (automation with human intelligence). It emphasized respect for people and continuous improvement, directly shaping Lean’s core principles.
- Context: TPS made Toyota a benchmark for efficiency, influencing Lean’s spread to the U.S. in the 1980s.
- Quality Circles – 1960s–1970s
- Origin: Popularized in Japan by Kaoru Ishikawa, quality circles involved workers collaborating to identify and solve quality issues.
- Impact: These groups fostered employee involvement and problem-solving, a precursor to the team-based project work in Six Sigma (e.g., Black Belt-led teams). Ishikawa’s cause-and-effect diagrams (fishbone diagrams) are still used in Six Sigma.
- Context: Widely adopted in Japanese industries, later influencing Western quality programs.
- Total Quality Management (TQM) – 1970s–1980s
- Key Figures: Building on TQC, Deming, Juran, and Philip B. Crosby popularized TQM in the U.S. and globally. Crosby’s “zero defects” concept emphasized prevention over inspection.
- Impact: TQM integrated quality into all organizational processes, focusing on customer satisfaction, employee involvement, and continuous improvement. It lacked Six Sigma’s rigorous statistical focus but shared its goal of defect reduction and process optimization.
- Context: TQM was widely adopted by Western companies in the 1980s, including Motorola, which later developed Six Sigma.
How These Led to Six Sigma, Lean, and Black Belts
- Six Sigma (1986): Motorola’s Bill Smith and Mikel Harry built on SQC and TQM, adding rigorous statistical tools (e.g., aiming for 3.4 defects per million opportunities) and a structured methodology (DMAIC). The Black Belt concept, inspired by martial arts, formalized roles for trained experts, drawing from TQM’s focus on leadership and training.
- Lean (1980s–1990s): Lean evolved directly from TPS, popularized in the U.S. by James Womack and Daniel Jones in their book The Machine That Changed the World (1990). It focused on waste elimination and flow, complementing Six Sigma’s defect focus.
- Black Belts: The Black Belt role, introduced by Motorola, was a novel way to professionalize quality roles, inspired by martial arts hierarchies (developed by Jigoro Kano in the 1880s for judo) and built on TQM’s emphasis on trained quality leaders.
These earlier methodologies provided the statistical, cultural, and operational foundations for Six Sigma and Lean, with Black Belts emerging as a structured way to implement these principles. “
What Are Performance Charts?
“Service Levels” are the standard of failure, not the standard of success. Flawed reporting and SLA bonuses can make performance worse! Try this approach instead:

Start with a definition of Quality and Target Excellence.

AVOID: First Flawed Approach: Tables That Summarize Performance

AVOID: Second Flawed Approach: Bad Visuals Are Worse Than No Visual!

At 8 Days, a service request becomes a “Lost Cause” for an SLA Bonus!

25 Days> We’ve got to boost the Under 7 Day Total. Too Bad For You!

Seeing The Problem is Step #1. We Can Help You Fix it!
Software as a Service

Software as a service is frequently offered with a “free tier” or “freemium” option for testers to evaluate the suitability for use. After that, typical billing is either per seat licensing or “pay per use”. While per-seat agreements are attractive for a fixed and predictable periodic expense, there are a few things to watch for.
1. Seat bundles. Licenses may be offered in bundles of 10, 25 or more.
2. Vendors that don’t publish hard price commitments often want to negotiate a contract commitment or upsell.
3. License renewals may not have a cap on price increases.
4. License management, making sure that every seat is filled, requires oversight.
5. Per seat licensing agreements may not easily scale up or down when demand for the service changes over time.
“Pay for use” services easily scale up or down. This reduces costs when need for the service declines, but the total cost over time may be harder to predict, harder to budget, and may wind up costing more than per seat licenses.
Run the numbers and model scenarios when comparing vendors with different payment models.
Final thought, always identify a primary vendor and a backup plan for cloud-based services. Know how you will route phones, emails, web traffic and where you will host servers just in case.
The largest vendors in the business will obsolete a service when it is no longer a part of their tech road map. (Microsoft SKYPE, Amazon Chime Business Calling, etc.)